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Book Review: P Dobner & M Loughlin The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, University of Edinburgh. 
 
Transnationalism and globalisation, broadly understood as the proliferation of juris-
generative sites beyond the state and the state’s diminishing purchase on societal activity 
including trans-border flows of capital, goods, information and people, is a pervasive theme 
in contemporary politics. The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, the first in a new Constitutional 
Theory series by OUP, approaches this theme from the viewpoint of constitutionalism, one of 
the hallmarks of modern sovereign statehood. In the constitutional register, globalisation and 
transnationalism raise questions about the legitimacy of government and public power as well 
as the production, nature and function of law in society. The central concern of this volume is 
whether constitutionalism is something which is intractably embedded in the historically 
fixed form of the sovereign state and therefore shares its fate in a globalised and 
transnationalised world, or whether it can migrate from its statist origins and potentially have 
a new career in the contemporary world, legitimising the functions of non-state entities 
exercising public or administrative power; in sum, do the twin forces of transnationalism and 
globalisation constitute the death of the constitutional ideal or its salvation? 
 The answer to this question will, of course, depend on how the contested concept of 
constitutionalism is itself defined. That constitutionalism is open to an array of meanings and 
interpretations is evident in the sixteen individual contributions, virtually all of which spend 
some time staking out a meaning of constitutionalism (with the slightly unfortunate result that 
the book can seem somewhat repetitive as many of the chapters cover the same or similar 
ground regarding the history of the development of constitutionalism in the state context).  
 There are a number of ways to cut the conceptual cake of constitutionalism, and as 
Walker contends in his contribution, a certain degree of abstraction is necessary in doing so 
(296). However, this task encounters a particular Procrustean dilemma; abstract too much in 
defining constitutional ideals and you end up with a thin, desiccated version of 
constitutionalism which retains limited analytical purchase, abstract too little, and 
constitutionalism becomes a parochial, predominantly European construction centring on the 
culturally, almost ethnically, homogenous nation state which is so specific as to make 
questions regarding its demise irrelevant and its exportation to non-state settings 
imperialistic.  
 For Grimm, Preuss and Loughlin, state constitutionalism entails a very specific form of 
political and legal practice which is historically fixed and had its hey-day from the post-
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revolutionary late eighteenth century to the pre-war twentieth. For these authors, the question 
posed by the title to this collection is a resounding yes, given that the demise of the state ipso 
facto constitutes the demise of constitutionalism, at least in its original (and best) form. The 
accent in these contributions is on the constitutive nature of constitutionalism, the pouvoir 
constituant which provides the foundation for political community, a phenomenon which 
reached its apotheosis in the nation state and has become the standard-bearer of political 
legitimacy in modernity. None of these, rather elegiac, contributions deny that something 
resembling constitutionalism has taken on a new shadow-existence in the post-Westphalian 
era with respect to non-state sites, however, as Loughlin clearly emphasises in his account of 
constitutionalisation as opposed to constitutionalism, the exportation of constitutionalism 
beyond the state represents only a part of what was originally a more robust form of 
constitutionalism, whereby not only government but the nation was constituted in an ancient 
constitution (52); something which is a chimera outside of the state container. 
 Practically all the other contributions have fewer compunctions about the ability of 
the constitutional concept to transcend its statist origins and play a potentially useful and 
important role in the realities of the increasing fragmentation and dispersal of public power 
both within and amongst societies. Dobner, Llanque and Brunkhorst, for example, focusing 
on the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism, do not hesitate to explore the 
constitutional idea in a globalised setting beyond the state, however none are particularly 
sanguine about the results. Brunkhorst argues that the normative force of constitutionalism 
stems from de facto recognition and acceptance by the people, highlighting the problems 
which the lack of such de facto acceptance pose for non-state constitutionalism. Both Dobner 
and Llanque consider the more classic paradigms of constitutional democracy and 
citizenship, the former arguing that the globalisation of law is fundamentally anathema to the 
democratic ideals of constitutionalism. 
Two sections of the collection deal specifically with particular manifestations of non-
state constitutional discourse; the constitutionalisation of the European Union (EU) and 
International law. Scharpf, Riekmann and much more obliquely Borzel, consider the 
constitutional credentials of the EU. Scharpf in a rich and engaging chapter identifies the 
political philosophies of liberalism and republicanism as providing the primary normative 
thrusts of the modern constitutional idea, the latter in particular providing the intellectual 
foundation of democratic legitimacy in modern constitutionalism. (90-92). Abstracting 
constitutionalism to the level of a universalising political philosophy obviously clears the 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 2011/01 
 
! 3 
hurdle for its transportation beyond the state setting, and in this vein, Scharpf considers the 
core questions of political legitimacy which underpins these conceptions in the EU context. 
However his diagnosis is not encouraging as he finds manifold problems with the workings 
of the EU from a republican perspective, which are not compensated for by the liberal 
economic rights and strong judicial review which form the core of EU constitutional 
discourse. (111-117) Similarly, Riekmann considers the institutionalisation of democratic 
legitimacy in the EU context by looking at the role of national parliaments in EU decision-
making, portraying a mixed picture even after the advances in national parliamentary input 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty reforms.  
  The challenges of constitutionalism at the international level are taken up by Kumm 
and Wahl, one more sceptical, the other less so with regard to the potential career of 
constitutionalism in respect of the international legal regime. Kumm, in burnishing the 
credentials of non-state constitutionalism, particularly in the sphere of international law, 
rejects the view that constitutional authority is based on supposed legitimate origins by a 
pouvoir constituant. For Kumm constitutions are made, not begotten, and their legitimacy 
necessarily relies on factors other than pudendous origins even in the state context; to wit the 
normative principles immanent in modern constitutional practice which can easily be 
replicated in political and legal practices beyond the state. Wahl takes up Kumm’s gambit by 
providing an analysis of the potential foundations of a putative international law 
constitutionalism such as international fundamental rights protection and ius cogens norms 
(226-229). However, emphasising the longue durée of state constitutionalism, he argues that 
proclaiming a fully-fledged international legal constitutionalism would be premature.  
For those who heed Wahl’s counsel about rushing to embrace a global 
constitutionalism, then Krisch and Somek’s alternative regime of Global Administrative Law 
(GAL) might provide a more palatable antidote to anxieties about the lack of control of the 
fragmented power resulting from globalisation and transnationalism. Krisch argues that GAL 
can be seen as a support rather than a threat to democracy and self-government at the national 
level by ensuring the restraint and accountability of non-state actors, and perhaps more 
importantly, by providing a more modest alternative to global constitutionalism. A lingering 
sense of self-doubt surround attempts to differentiate GAL as an autonomous field from more 
mainstream non-state constitutional discourses, and this becomes clear in Krisch’s 
contribution. In attempting to distinguish GAL from global constitutionalism, even in its 
most desiccated form, there is a sense in which it never quite manages to shake off its 
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shadow. For Krisch, with a nod to Loughlin, global constitutionalism never quite lives up to 
its statist billing, (252) however the reasons why even a ‘small c’ constitutionalism, which 
would come very close to the ideals of the GAL movement, is neither possible nor desirable, 
is not developed. One gets the sense on reading this chapter that broadly speaking 
constitutionalism and GAL do not exist on different ‘planes’ as Krisch contends (256), but 
rather form part of a continuum differentiated by the modesty of ambition of their respective 
proponents in addressing the problems posed by contemporary realities.  
The implications of a genuinely global administrative law are explored by Somek in 
an intriguing, if somewhat convoluted, chapter. For Somek, transnationalism has produced a 
proliferation of bureaucracy at different levels, which, following Weber, and presaging the 
societal constitutionalism in the ensuing section of the book, pursue a non-legal 
administrative rationality. This post-state administration is not backed up by sovereignty 
given that the various administrative sites have a jurisdictionally bound mandate but it 
nonetheless constitutes—claims Somek, following Foucault—the expansion of the state ‘the 
agency busying itself with governing’ (287), rather than its hollowing out or demise. Somek 
finds no counter-weight to this expansion in GAL, or indeed any legal form and heralds this 
development as the triumph of the state over law and politics (287), which, it seems, nothing 
short of a global sovereign could tame.  
The final section of the collection, on societal constitutionalism, is perhaps the most 
confident about the possibilities of non-state constitutionalism. The anxieties of unchecked 
and illegitimate power animate Walker’s chapter which provides the most concrete and at the 
same time necessarily abstract, definition of the concept of constitutionalism (296). There is a 
sense of urgency about Walker’s contribution in arguing for some role for constitutionalism 
in the globalised world, even as a ‘longstop’ or ‘placeholder’ (307) function, if we are not to 
lose the important contribution constitutionalism makes in providing mechanisms for putting 
things in common, and indeed, it would seem, to the existence of a public sphere more 
generally. The abstraction of the concept of constitutionalism perhaps reaches its zenith in 
Prandini and Teubner’s contributions which draw on systems theory to argue for the realities 
of societal constitutionalism. Approaching constitutionalism in the abstract register of 
systems theory makes the concept much more amenable to transportation beyond and indeed 
beneath the state, where the classic structural coupling of law and politics is replaced with an 
array of other systemic couplings. On this account, social systems can be structurally coupled 
in a variety of permutations and combinations rather like LEGO bricks to produce novel 
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forms of societal constitutionalism. However, Prandini, in his account of the ‘morphogenesis’ 
or evolution of the constitutional idea, claims that societal constitutionalism is no mere 
juridification. Rather, it is the particular problems which constitutionalism addresses which 
distinguish societal constitutionalism from juridification, namely the problem of the polity 
and the problem of self-governance. (320)  
 Teubner’s concerns lie with the classic aspect of state constitutionalism, fundamental 
rights protection, and particularly and how they can be protected against non-state actors who 
wield considerable economic, financial and now arguably political power. He argues that it is 
only possible to understand societal constitutionalism, and by implication the protection of 
fundamental rights in the private sphere, if a series of myths or misunderstandings about 
globalisation and law are debunked (329). Ultimately, for Teubner, we must dispense with 
legal forms to protect fundamental rights in the private sphere which can only ever 
imperfectly capture the factors at play; communication and individual integrity. Fundamental 
rights protection must occur internally, that is from the viewpoint of one of the conflicting 
regimes (340), a sobering (and provocative) thought for proponents of robust, law-based 
enforcement of fundamental rights standards.  
On balance then, the answer given by the majority of the contributions to this 
collection to the question posed by its title is a qualified ‘no’. Even if current trends and 
institutional arrangements fall (at times egregiously) short of the ideals and normative values 
of state constitutionalism, the concept still makes sense out of its statist habitat, and can 
potentially resolve problems caused by the hollowing out of the state in terms of checking 
and legitimising public power. However, even if the concept still has relevance in 
contemporary society, this collection provokes the conclusion, to this reviewer at least, that 
constitutionalism shares the fate of the protagonists of Di Lampedusa’s classic work, Il 
Gattopardo: it will have to change in order for it to stay the same.  
